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INTRODUCTION
When I first conceived of an investigation into Islamic law, my intention was to explore
and examine the thesis that Bernard Lewis first set forth in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” and
Samuel Huntington later articulated in his seminal work, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order
. In the “Roots of Muslim Rage,” Lewis writes,
I
t should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue
them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but
surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our JudeoChristian heritage,
our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important
that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also
equally irrational reaction against that rival.1
In order to determine the validity of the Clash Thesis, I examined the foundations that
compose, undergird, and constitute any civilization, its legal system. If the basic assumptions of
Clash Thesis are correct, the legal system of Islamic societies should be relatively monolithic
instead of constituting a gradient or continuum from one part of the Islamic world to another as
local conditions vary. As my case study, I examined Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, with a
special emphasis upon its reform in the nineteenth century and abolition in the twentieth century.
When I conducted my research, most of the primary source law texts that I could have
examined were written in languages that I could not read. As a result, I relied primarily upon
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secondary sources, in particular academic journal articles that analyze different periods of
Islamic legal development during the Ottoman Empire’s long history, but whose findings had not
been integrated into a larger historical survey. The way that this study contributes to the existing
literature on Islamic law and the history of the Empire is the way that it links together many
existing studies of Islamic law with an emphasis upon the impact of local conditions and
interactions with nonIslamic legal traditions. Discovering the extent to which Islamic law
reflects an ideal type, as the Clash Thesis would tend to support, or not is tremendously
important for future scholarship and contemporary policy debate in a number of different fields.
Through my research, I found that Islamic law has evolved and changed in response to
local conditions in a similar manner to most other intellectual and institutional phenomena. Thus,
the extent to which one can reliably infer the character of Islamic law in a specific context by
calling upon it as an ideal type is much more limited than prior studies and popular opinion
would suggest. Islamic law is not a set of universal precepts of understandings that remain
unchanged and inviolate across the ages. On a higher level, the contingent nature of Islamic law
tends to undermine both traditional Orientalist and modern culturalist understandings about
Islamic societies such as the Clash Thesis. Examining Lewis and Huntington’s Clash Thesis is
not only valuable for its academic dimension, but also for the impact of the findings for forming
and implementing policy. On one level, the assumption that Islamic law, and Islam, is as
monolithic and unchanging as the Clash Thesis purports it to be worsens the character and
quality of intellectual debate.2

On another, more immediate level, the assumption helps to

emboldens voices who claim that Islam and the West are incompatible and that embracing
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Jorgen S. Nielsen, “Shar’ia: Immutable or Adaptable,” in 
Shari'a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the
Encounter with Europe
, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010), 1.
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Westernstyle modernity necessarily entails the destruction of Islamic heritage and culture.
While paradigms like the Clash Thesis possess a type of conceptual and aesthetic power, it is
necessary to assess their relation to reality and, if there is disparity, one must reconsider, revise,
or reject their base assumptions.

CHAPTER 1: PREVIOUS APPROACHES TOWARD THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC LAW
The Nature of Paradigms
Before delving into the facts, dates, and events that compose this study, it is necessary to
analyze the methodological approach that structures it. A brief introduction is especially
necessary given the significant degree to which the foundations of the Orientalist paradigm, and
its later articulation in the Clash Thesis, are different from those from which this study proceeds.
The paradigm that Lewis and Huntington employ traces its intellectual genealogy to a prior
paradigm that dominated the study of the MiddleEast, Orientalism. While Lewis and
Huntington’s paradigm is more undoubtedly more sophisticated than that of the previous
Orientalists, it still makes many of the assumptions as its predecessor. Thus, it is useful to
examine the nature of paradigms and Orientalism to understand the potential inadequacies of the
Clash Thesis.
A paradigm is a set of shared commitments regarding the character of individual entities
and their relationships with other entities. The formation of a paradigm is necessary for two or
more parties to engage in any meaningful, constructive discourse because, if the two parties do
not share a minimum number of commitments, they will be unable to communicate and lay the
foundations for more advanced inquiry. In the process of paradigm formation, one forms classes
of entities and the relationships between them by emphasizing the common attributes of certain
entities and deemphasizing other common attributes. The process is necessary because there is

4
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no class that shares an attribute to the exclusion of all other classes and there are some members
of a class that resemble other classes more closely than they do other members of their same
class. Once a given community forms or adopts a paradigm, it appears to be the only accurate
description of the world. Although the community may change or alter a limited number of the
connections within the paradigm, it will always retain a number of base commitments that are
inviolable and sacrosanct. If one seeks to dislodge one of the base commitments, it will lead to a
transformation in the entire system, rendering something substantially new from what was
present before.3 Understanding the constructedness of paradigms helps to expose potential flaws
in previous approaches toward Islamic societies and law.
Orientalism as Paradigm
In advancing its central argument, the traditional Orientalist paradigm entails a number of
important assumptions about Islamic civilization and its relation to Western civilization. Firstly,
it assumes that there are a set of definable and definite criteria that identify an Islamic society as
opposed to a nonIslamic society. Secondly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is monolithic.
Thirdly, it assumes that Islamic societies are stagnant and unable to develop. Fourthly, it assumes
that Islam and Islam alone is the defining aspect of all societies that compose Islamic
civilization. Fifthly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is homogenous so that any society it
designates as Islamic is essentially equivalent in all substantial aspects to another society that it
designates as Islamic. Sixthly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is eternally hostile to other
civilizational groups, but especially the West. Lastly and most importantly, Orientalism conceals
its discursive nature and purports merely to be an accurate description of what is the case.That is
3

For a full description of this view of paradigms with examples, consult Thomas Kuhn, “Second Thoughts on
Paradigms,” http://eu.pravo.hr/_download/repository/Second_Thoughts_on_Paradig ms.pdf (accessed on March 5,
2015).
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not to say that there is not Orientalist scholarship that made important discoveries or was able to
break out, to a certain extent, from the paradigm as an ideal type. However, the extent to which
some of these empiricallyunfounded attitudes have remained in serious scholarship and the
public imagination is staggering and cannot be ignored.4
The Orientalist paradigm argues that major reason why Islamic civilization lagged behind
the West was because its schools of jurisprudence were inflexible and actively hostile to
innovation. In particular, the Orientalist paradigm emphasizes that, after the establishment of the
main schools of Islamic jurisprudence in the ninth and tenth centuries and the subsequent
‘closing of the gate of ijtihad,’ Islamic jurists could no longer exercise the independent reasoning
necessary to respond to innovation.5 According to Orientalism, supposed inflexibility and lack of
innovation in the legal sphere gave rise to a civilizational character that, in general, denigrated
independent thought and innovation.6 Furthermore, the Orientalists believe that European
civilization possessed an openness, expressed and guaranteed by its positivistic, secular legal
tradition, that allowed it to develop the scientific method and worldview.7 The scientific
worldview gradually empowered Western civilization and made it dominant among all others.
However, in line with the analysis of paradigms above, it seems unlikely that, 
necessarily,
Western and Islamic civilization and their legal traditions are as separated and distinct as
Orientalism purports. Thus, Orientalism’s claim that the West’s distinct character, and the
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For a full description of Orientalism, consult Edward Said, 
Orientalism
(New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
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V. Necla Geyikdagi, 
Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire
(New York: Tauris Academic Studies,

2011), 13.
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Armando Salvatore, “Tradition and Modernity within Islamic Civilization and the West,” in 
Islam and
Modernity: Key Issues and Debates
, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press,
2009), 4.
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constituent aspects of that character like its legal tradition, was the cause of its material
ascendancy appears dubious.
The Limitations of Orientalism
In line with the nature of paradigms, although one can delineate the elements that
compose the class of Islamic civilization, one forms the class not by appealing to a definite set of
characteristics that Islamic civilization possess to the exclusion of all other civilizations; rather
one forms the class by learning to emphasize and suppress specific characteristics between
individual entities that compose classes. For example, certain sects of Islam, particularly Shia
Islam, possess a messianic character similar to that present in Christianity. However, in the
process of intellectual formation, one learns to suppress the characteristics that Shia Islam shares
with Christianity and emphasize the characteristics it shares with other Sunni sects. Whereas,
formerly, the observer encountered intersecting, dynamic relationships among a sea of inchoate
data, he or she now perceives a series of discrete classes that appear to share little in common
with one another and each constitute a world unto themselves. However, the original dynamic,
intersecting relationships between individual entities do not actually disappear; they remain
hidden beneath the surface of the paradigmatic apparatus and can reemerge if one chooses to
examine and reorder its foundations. The scholar Edward Said raises this point, albeit in a
simplified form, in his response to the Clash Thesis, “The Clash of Ignorance.” Said notes, “
This
is the problem with unedifying labels like Islam and the West the [which paradigms like
Orientalism and the Clash Thesis propound]: They mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying
to make sense of a disorderly reality that won't be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as all
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that.”8 Therefore, the perceived and actual points of division between Islamic civilization and
Western civilization are more porous and constructed than they may appear upon initial
examination.
The inadequacy of Orientalism does not mean that the researcher must succumb to a
postmodern interpretation of reality and intellectual progress. Paradigms are necessary for any
form of intellectual progress. However, one must always be attentive to what composes a
paradigm and seek to modify it in a way that most accurately describes the character of and
relationships between classes and their constituent entities. At the very least, the nature of
paradigms forces the researcher to acknowledge that it is unlikely that different classes, namely
Islamic and Western civilization, are as separated as Orientalism supposes. Some have taken the
criticism of the traditional Orientalist paradigm to mean that any attempt to understand Islam as
an intellectual system is inherently biased. Others have deferred to rosy declarations that Islam is
necessarily a religion of peace rather than a dynamic, living intellectual tradition in which
multiple actors participate and claim membership. This study seeks to avoid these unfortunate
pitfalls and grapple with the history of Islamic law as it has actually occurred.
Conclusions
The nature of paradigms makes it likely that Islamic law is open to the same process of
development, contingency, and differentiation as any other legal tradition. Therefore, paradigms
that suppose a stark division between entities, like the Clash Thesis, are potentially dubious. As
the following empirical analysis of legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries demonstrates, Islamic law does not actually possess the characteristics
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Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” 
The Nation
(2001), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/clas
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nce (accessed March 3, 2015).
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that the Orientalists ascribed to it, precisely because it is always located in a contingent,
sociohistorical milieu. Consequently, theoretical formations that proceed, at least in part, from
an Orientalist substrate, such as the Clash Thesis are susceptible to critique and academic
reexamination both from a theoretical and empirical point of view.

CHAPTER 2: GENERAL PATTERNS OF ISLAMIC LEGAL FORMATION
The Types of Islamic Law, 
Sharia
vs. 
Fiqh
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to differentiate between the two types of
Islamic law, the 
sharia and 
fiqh
. While some groups disagree, most Muslim scholars consider the
sharia to be the overreaching, pure law that God bestowed to Muhammad and 
fiqh to be the
attempt to apply the overreaching, universal series of principles and admonitions present within
the Qur’an, Hadith, and other sources to specific cases.9 The process of analogical and innovative
reasoning contained within 
fiqh is particularly important in determining how a Muslim should
act in the face of specific scenarios and conditions that were alien to Arabian society during the
time of the Muhammad, those that Muhammad did not encounter and render judgement upon
during his life, or developed after Muhammad died. After Muhammad died and without the
existence of codified schools of 
fiqh
, or even a single, authoritative version of the Qur'an or
Hadith, Muslim rulers ruled and governed in a necessarily adhoc manner, especially in regard to
new or undelineated conditions. In responding to these conditions, the rulers were practicing
f
iqh
, but they did not do so in a systematic way. During the ninth and tenth centuries, as Islam
spread even wider geographically and entrenched itself in the existing institutional and
intellectual structures that it encountered, there was an increasing need for systematic
compilations of 
fiqh to establish the intellectual continuity of Islamic law and provide the tools to
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Jorgen S. Nielsen, 3  4.
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train new judges. The need for systematic 
fiqh motivated numerous jurists to create schools of
Islamic jurisprudence (
madhhabs
), all of which reflect different “legal discourses and
hermeneutic principles.”10Thus, there are actually two types of Islamic law: the 
sharia
, God’s
universal, abstract, perfect and allencompassing law that Muhammad received; and 
fiqh
, the
process by which the individual interprets God’s law, systematic versions of which are present in
the 
madhhabs
.11
Islamic law as 
fiqh
, through codifications like the Ottoman 
Mecelle
, is subject to local
conditions and thus “shares some features with other legal traditions such as Common Law and
other modern legal systems.”12 Not only is difference of opinion to be expected, but it necessarily
follows from human cognition attempting to grapple with divine knowledge.13 In the same way
that a modern political theorist writing about democracy would impugn certain characteristics to
it, he or she would also acknowledge that local conditions shape the experience of democracy in
a way that differs from the generalization. Within the Sunni sect alone, five major schools
currently exist, the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zahiri, excluding other major schools that
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Guy Burak, "The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The PostMongol Context of the Ottoman Adoption of

a School of Law,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History
55 (2013): 582.
11

Frank E. Vogel, 
Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia
(Leiden, NLD: Brill, N.H.E.J.,
N.V. Koninklijke, Boekhandel en Drukkerij, 2000), 4  5.
12

Ahmed E. Souaiaia, 
Contesting Justice: Women, Islam, Law, and Society
(Ithaca: State University of New
York Press, 2008), xiii.
13

Abdullahi Ahmed AnNacim, "The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of
Islamic Law and State Law," 
Modern Law Review
73 (1) (2010): 21.

12
no are no longer extent such as the Jariri, Laythi, Awza'i, and Thawri.14 Additionally, within
Shia Islam, other schools exist such as the Ismaili, Zaidi, and Jafari.15
The 
madhhabs have reacted dynamically in response to the political, economic, social,
and environmental milieu in which they exist. Moreover, 
madhhabs have coexisted along and
interacted with nonIslamic legal traditions, such as the Central Asian/Mongolic, Persian, and
Roman.16 However, many Islamic jurists have historically attempted to obfuscate the connection
between Islamic and nonIslamic legal traditions and the connection between the 
sharia and 
fiqh
.
The jurists would usually also argue that their own 
madhhab supplied the only accurate heuristic
framework to understand the 
sharia
, blurring the lines between two different types of Islamic
law and obscuring the extent to which Islamic law existed alongside other nonIslamic legal
traditions.17 The jurists most often did so because to argue otherwise meant undermining the
credibility of their own 
madhhab
. For example, during the Umayyad and Abbasid empires,
Islamic jurists argued that the 
sharia was the highest and only true standard of justice and
legislation, superseding that of secular rulers and kingdoms.18 The jurists argued that the 
sharia
,
as the highest standard of ethical conduct, served to circumscribe the actions of secular rulers and
defend the vulnerable masses.19 However, despite the sweeping, monolithic characterization that

14

Ahmed AnNa’im Abdullahi, “Sharia in the Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation,” in 
Law
Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Shari'a
, ed. Peri Bearman et al. (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 326.
15

Ibid.
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Sami Zubaida, 
Law and Power in the Islamic World
(London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 108.

17

M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey: Islam without Shari’a,” in 
Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the
Modern World
, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 153.
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Ibid.
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the jurists assigned to Islamic law, its implementation often fell under the purview of the secular
state and interacted dynamically with other legal traditions in a larger juridical continuum. While
Islamic law has been an important aspect of Islamic societies and governments, it has always
operated most strongly in the private lives of subjects, rather than being a determinative
constraint upon state policy. Rulers such as Mehmed II of the Ottoman Empire even codified and
established legal systems on a primarily secular basis, only to bring them into line with Islamic
law during a later period.20 Importantly, these relationships and patterns of organization were not
peculiar to the Ottoman state; rather they have been fairly common among Islamic states and
societies in historical and contemporary environs.
The Experience of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire
The experience of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire further validates the contingent
nature of Islamic law. Before the nineteenth century, Islamic law, mostly under the Hanafi
madhhab
, reacted dynamically and in tandem with strong traditions of customary and statutory
law within the Empire. Moreover, conditions peculiar to the Ottoman state left their indelible
mark upon the expression and character of Islamic law. Both of these factors set the stage for the
unique transformations that Islamic law underwent in the Empire during the nineteenth century.
Initial Orientalist scholarship emphasized the degree to which purely Islamic concepts of
jihad and the frontierwarrior, or 
ghazi
, were the primary basis of Ottoman identity, legitimacy,
and authority. However, with further scholarship, it has become apparent that the Ottoman state
not only was integrated into the existing “political and economic environments of Europe and the
Mediterranean” but also “articulated sovereignty and claimed legitimacy by multiple means,

20

Sami Zubaida, 220.
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drawing on the entire legacy of TurkoIranoIslamic kingship as well as [its] Byzantine
heritage.”21 For example, the Ottoman frontierwarrior, 
ghazi identity drew upon the embattled
attitude that the Islamic world assumed during the search to reorganize itself in the wake of the
Mongol invasions and the “legacy of confusion and anarchy” that had characterized the final
days of Byzantine rule.22 Thus, fundamental aspects of the Empire’s Islamic identity were unique
products of their historical milieu and derived from a partially nonIslamic substrate. Whereas
formerly, scholars believed that Ottoman institutions and intellectual currents proceeded on a
mostly, if not purely Islamic basis, the present trend has emphasized how nonIslamic elements
in the Empire coexisted and evolved with Islamic elements.
In the Ottoman Empire, the legal traditions of CentralAsian tribal societies such as the
Mongols and Turks, and the Persian tradition of law and statecraft were as great influence upon
its legal and governmental structure as the Islamic tradition. Situated within a larger
“TurkoIranoIslamic political matrix,23 Ottoman Islamic law reacted dynamically with
surrounding political, economic, social, and intellectual conditions. The CentralAsian tradition
required a ruler to proclaim a set of laws rooted in “tradition and custom” and enforce its
arbitrary, just application to his subjects; the 
yasa 
of Genghis Khan is the archetypal product of
this tradition.24 The preIslamic, Persian legal tradition posited that the ruler was absolutely
sovereign and omnipotent and, as such, he had to arbitrate personally all significant disputes; the
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Douglas E. Streusand, 
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(Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2010), 29  31.
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(London, UK: Continuum International Publishing, 2008), 21.
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Abbasid caliphs were previous Muslim rulers who drew upon the Persian tradition.25 The
Ottoman sultans and their bureaucracy drew upon both of these traditions to govern in
conjunction with Islamic law.
Drawing on the CentralAsian tradition, the Ottoman sultan and his bureaucracy, the
Empire’s central executive, regularly issued a series of statutory laws, called the 
kanun
,
‘urfi
, or
sultanic laws. Periodically, government functionaries would distribute new 
kanun from the
center to the provincial courts, adding to the existing statutory corpus.26 For instance, through the
kanun
, the bureaucracy created and structured the taxfarming system that provided the state with
its revenues, which did not have precedent in the Islamic tradition, and differed according to
local customary laws.27 The statutory laws served as the primary legal structure of the Empire
and expanded the authority of the executive at the expense of the religious establishment.28 The
sultan himself and his bureaucracy were often comparatively uninitiated in the intricate
structures and exacting details of Islamic law, delegating the duty of retaining and maintaining
its corpus to the 
ulema
.29 Moreover, influenced by the Persian model, the sultan and his
bureaucracy claimed the authority to protect subjects from abuse and so many of the statutory
laws defined and regulated the relationship between the peasants and the local populace, making
sure that the taxfarmers did not excessively abuse their tenants.30

25
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Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey
(Cambridge,
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Whereas, in theory, the Islamic judge (
qadi
) only renders judgement in accordance with
the school of jurisprudence to which he ascribes, the Ottoman state entrusted its 
qadis with
rendering judgements in consideration of its complete juridical corpus. The 
qadis 
rendered
rulings that drew upon statutory, customary, and Islamic traditions.31 In the process, Ottoman
jurists (
muftis
) often sought to and did bring nonIslamic practices into closer conformance with
their schools of jurisprudence. However, while jurists were, in some circumstances, successful in
situating the statutory laws within an Islamic discourse and character in some way, they did not
change their essential nonIslamic trajectory and character.32 Additionally, through their
interpretation of Islamic law, the Empire and its religious officials drew upon a highly
heterogeneous and diverse medieval Islamic legal tradition.33 The mix of different traditions,
operating under the supremacy of the sultan’s 
kanun
, statutory laws, characterized all Ottoman
legal structures from the fiscal, to the criminal, to the commercial.34
Nonetheless, Islamic legal frameworks continued to exercise significant influence. For
example, the state levied a tax on nonMuslims (
cizye) in exchange for their exemption from
military service, rule by their own laws and customs, and protection by the sultan.35 Moreover,
the state regulated the operation of Islamic charitable entities such as the 
waqf and rendered them
largely exempt from taxes for the services they provided to their surrounding communities.
While the sultan and his bureaucracy ruled in a largely secular, extraIslamic fashion, the state
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was careful to promulgate an official discourse of strict adherence to the faith and often cloaked
and justified extraIslamic practices by appealing to an Islamic discourse.36 The Islamic
discourse assured the Muslim populace and religious establishment that the basis of all Ottoman
law was the 
sharia and that the sultan, in serving as its ultimate executor and successor to the
caliphate, was the defender of the faith.37 The heavy discursive emphasis upon the 
sharia may
have been a principal reason why European observers began to blend together 
fiqh and 
sharia
,
rendering Islamic law, in their minds, a monolithic, unchanging system.
As the preceding evidence demonstrates, within the Ottoman Empire, Islamic Law
interacted with numerous other traditions of law and governance. Not only did the traditions
coexist among each other, but also they exerted an influence upon one another, leading to new
developments. However, ideas are only one component that shapes the expression of Islamic law
in a given context. Institutions are also vitally important.
The Empire’s Arbiters of Islamic Law
The institutional character of the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact upon its
Islamic legal tradition. From its inception, the Empire was distinguished in its “elaborate
administrative apparatus with a formalized hierarchy of rank and written regulations,” with the
apparatus extending “authority from the imperial court, to the administration, of the provinces,
from fiscal affairs to military provisions.”38 Within the context of its centralizing tendency, the
state extended its administrative apparatus to control over the religious establishment that
oversaw the arbitration and implementation of its laws. The bureaucratic character of the
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Empire’s institutions led to a unique relationship between the the dominant Hanafi school and
the state, which was markedly different from prior relationships between ruling dynasties and
madhhabs
.39
Prior to the Ottoman Empire, ruling dynasties had supported specific jurists or 
madhhabs
,
but they did not take a part in shaping the actual content of the 
madhhab 
itself to suit its interests
and preferences.40 In contrast, the Hanafi 
madhhab rose to prominence in the Empire only after
the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent proclaimed the restructuring of the legal system in
accordance with it and declared it to be the Sunni Muslim orthodoxy. The state itself would also
actively restructure the doctrine of the Sunni Hanafi school in line with its imperial objectives so
that it, in effect, Hanafi Sunni Islam became Ottoman Sunni Islam.41 More broadly, the advent of
greater levels of statecontrol over 
madhhabs may have been part of a larger pattern that took
hold in South and CentralAsian Islamic states during the period, particularly those in which the
Hanafi school was dominant.42 Nonetheless, while statecontrol over the Hanafi 
madhhab may
have been part of a larger, concurrent phenomena, the fact that the Empire adopted the attitude
was highly significant. The Empire would instantiate the normative and system of increasing
state control over Islamic life throughout the geographically, ethnically, and intellectually
diverse societies and peoples that they controlled, amplifying the importance of the development
in the Empire compared to surrounding societies. Moreover, because the Empire possessed a
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stronger operating system than comparable CentralAsian or SouthAsian states, it was able to
implement its normative system more vigorously.
The Ottoman Empire controlled the 
ulema, 
the arbiters of Islamic law, by making its
members a branch of the state itself. In contrast to other Islamic societies, the Ottoman state
managed the education, salary, and appointments of the 
ulema
. Within the religious bureaucracy,
there was a vast and farreaching stratification of rank with the highest office being the
seyhulislam or the mufti of Istanbul. Each judicial center in the provinces retained a 
qadi and,
oftentimes, the 
qadi of a particular judicial center would also serve as mayor and chief of police.
43

However, the 
qadis found their political and administrative role within the state circumscribed

by administrative supervisors (
hlulemr
).44 The 
seyhulislam, 
the Empire’s chief jurist, issued
fatwas
, rulings or determinations made in accordance with Islamic law, oversaw the
implementation of Islamic law throughout the state, and headed the Office of the 
Seyhulislam
.45
The state issued numerous “laws, decrees, and local orders” for the writing and preservation of
documents, registrations, and fees of 
qadis and 
sharia courts.46 Holders of high religious offices
such as the 
seyhulislam
, the 
qadiaskars 
of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the chief provincial 
qadis
were theoretically equal in rank to corresponding members of sultanic bureaucracy, such as the
grand vizier and provincial governors, and were able to exercise significant autonomy.47
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However, the vast religious establishment was still another branch of the Ottoman bureaucracy,
which the state controlled and directed towards its larger objectives as much as it could.
Given its control over the character and expression of Islamic law, the Ottoman Empire
used it to defend its authority against competing sources of solidarity from domestic and foreign
Muslim populations. While, though the 
millet system, the Empire made relatively generous
allowances of autonomy to certain nonMuslim populations, it sought to keep a tight grip over
Islamic religious life. Whenever heterodox Islamic populations appeared to gain a substantial
base of support that challenged the authority of the center, the state deported or placed
restrictions upon them in order to fragment their organizational structure.48 For example, the
Alevi
, or Qizilbash
, Shia sect supported policies of decentralization, which would allow religious
and political autonomy for its communities. In response, the state viewed the 
Alevis
’ religious
heterodoxy and the “alternative source of solidarity” that it supplied, as a threat to the integrity of
the state.49 Thus, in the Ottoman context, rather than the Islamic law serving as an outside check
on the power of the state, as was the classical interpretation, it served as a mechanism by which
the state could exercise its power. Indeed, it was the oppressed, heterodox Muslim populations
such as the 
Alevis who were the groups who were most likely to hearken back to the view of
Islamic law as a tool to circumscribe the power of rapacious rulers and the fundamental source of
all law.50 The Empire also appealed to its custody over the true Islamic orthodoxy to legitimate
its opposition to foreign challengers such as the Safavid dynasty of Iran.51 As with the many
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institutional relationships between the Ottoman center and periphery, divergences from official
state policy existed. This was especially true in the Maghreb and Eastern Arab provinces wherein
the Maliki and Shafii 
madhhabs respectively continued to exercise significant influence.52
However, the major trends and differences in the experience of Ottoman Islamic law, especially
compared to previous and contemporary Islamic societies, is clear.
Conclusions
In order to understand the nature of Islamic law in a specific society, one must pay
attention to the sociohistorical milieu in which it is situated. While the 
sharia
, the concept that
God’s divine knowledge is present in the Qur'an, the Sunna, and other texts, is unchanging and
monolithic, 
fiqh
, the human attempt to understand that knowledge, changes according to local
conditions and circumstances and is the actual Islamic law that has been operative in Islamic
societies. Since the Islamic law that 
madhhabs express is the latter rather than the former,
Islamic law, and Islamic civilization as a whole, is not necessarily unchanging or monolithic.
The further development and evolution of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire underscores the
contingent character of Islamic law.
In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law interacted with many different legal traditions such
as the Central Asian, Persian, and Roman, forming the foundations of the state’s ability to
articulate and propound sovereignty. Moreover, in the Empire, the religious establishment was
an extension of the state apparatus rather than being an extragovernmental institution. The
presence of many legal traditions and the religious establishment’s close relationship with the
state shaped and influenced Islamic law in the Empire more than any abstract, semantic notion of
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what constitutes it. For example, the Ottoman 
ulema
’s relationship with the state contrasted
markedly with that of the neighboring state of Qajar Iran whose 
ulema 
exercised significantly
more autonomy and were, in a real sense, an extragovernmental institution. The differing
relationship between the state and religious establishment, along with a host of other factors,
would lead to differences in the path of Islamic legal reform during the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER 3: ISLAMIC LEGAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE 19th CENTURY
The Impetus and Potential For Reform
Given the breadth and variability of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, it does not
appear it was necessarily less capable of development or change than its Western equivalents or
separated from other traditions of law in the way that the Clash Thesis maintains. Moreover, as
the Ottoman central government had a history of significant control over the religious
establishment, it seemed to possess the ability to undertake and enact systematic Islamic legal
reforms.53 Given that these appraisals are reasonably wellfounded in the historical and
methodological evidence, the question naturally emerges as to why a fusion of Islamic and
Western law did not occur during the age of nineteenthcentury Ottoman reform and why instead
the state embarked on a trajectory that would lead to the secular program of Mustafa Kemal and
his followers. While the Orientalist paradigm and the Clash Thesis contend that the Kemalists
rejected Islamic law in order to be able to embrace Western modernity, the actual forces at work
that led to the marginalization and abolition of Islamic law appear to be more complex.
The Ottoman legal reforms of the nineteenth century were part of a wider series of
policies known as defensive modernization or defensive developmentalism. Perceiving a threat
to their existence, MiddleEastern states employed defensive modernization policies in order to

53

Murteza Bedir, “Fikih to Law: Secularization through Curriculum,” 
Islamic Law and Society
11 (3) (2004):

386.

23

24
defend against European intervention, conquest, and economic peripheralization.54 The Ottoman
reform movements of the nineteenth century, and the later Kemalist regime, were similarly
characterized by the attempt to rationalize institutional functioning and centralize authority after
largescale decentralization that had occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The Empire’s successive military defeats at the hands of aspiring and existing European empires
and the subsequent, gradual cession of many of its most valuable European and Mediterranean
domains further heightened the reformist impulse.55 In this regard, the Empire, given its
administrative and institutional history, was in a stronger position than many nonEuropean
societies,56 especially compared to neighboring NearEastern states like Qajar Iran who were
highly decentralized or the states of the Arabian peninsula who had fewer resources to defend
against the European advance.
During the nineteenth century, Islamic legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire emerged
within the context of centralization and modernization. The struggle for sovereignty and legal
independence was epitomized by the fight against the Empire’s infamous capitulations to
European states. At the time of the initial reforms during the nineteenth century, the Empire had
previously granted various extraordinary powers and privileges to European states and their
representatives. While these privileges had formerly been minor impositions upon Ottoman
sovereignty, they became more pronounced over time in relation to Europe’s rising material
power. By the early nineteenth century, the Empire was enduring significant violations of its own
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sovereignty, which threatened the ability of the state to remain functionally or nominally
independent of European suzerainty. For example, in the case of a dispute involving a foreigner,
the consular courts of the foreigner’s nation would arbitrate rather than the Ottoman courts,
granting them favorable terms of justice.57 Moreover, the embassies excluded many of their
citizens from having to pay the state’s taxes and conforming to its regulations.58 The privileges
also allowed embassies to abuse treaty agreements granting special privileges to the embassies’
dragomans
, which caused deep and widespread abuse, particularly in Ottoman commercial
centers.59 In the wake of the creation of such a favorable commercial status, Ottoman citizens
began to petition European embassies to purchase 
dragoman status so that they could ignore
Ottoman laws, giving them a comparative advantage over their competition.60
The capitulations allowed European states to establish protective status over the
increasingly restive nonMuslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. The nationalistic impulse
led to everincreasing numbers of rebellions and attempts at secession, which drove the Ottoman
state deeper and deeper into the arms of European creditors both for the costs incurred during the
fighting and for the lost revenues from ceded territories. The protective status not only eroded the
state’s control over its subjects, but also lead to increased European intervention in the its
administrative affairs.61 By the beginning of the 
Tanzimat
, foreign embassies had already
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established a model of using political pressure and financial compensation to support Ottoman
political figures who would serve their aims and represent their interests, fracturing the internal
integrity of the state apparatus.62 Thus, as European economic and political power became more
prominent, the issue of the capitulations, both in functional and optical terms, became
progressively more acute.
In order to restore its sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire sought to reform its courts and
legal codes so that it could arbitrate disputes involving foreign nationals in its own courts. In this
way, the state would both retain elements of its indigenous law and institutions, and be able to
defend its sovereignty against European expansionism. Importantly, the initial pressure to
accommodate the Europeans meant that the subsequent attempt to reform the Ottoman legal
system would have to involve the importation of Western legal principles and codes.63 These
local conditions were decisive in shaping the future of Islamic law in the Empire.
The Course of Reform
At the beginning of the reform process, the Ottoman Empire established courts in its
great commercial centers to address the extraterritorial privileges that the capitulations afforded
European embassies and collaborating Ottoman citizens. In order to bring the Europeans into the
Ottoman legal system, the Empire instituted mixed (
Nizamiye
) courts that would employ
Europeanstyle codes, colored in part by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.64 During the
nineteenth century, the Ottoman Ministry of Justice was “engaged in an attempt to rationalize the
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Nizamiye court system through a reflexive process that included monitoring of irregularities,
disciplinary measures taken against transgressing officials, and a continuous reconsideration of
daily judicioadministrative practices.”65 In 1867, the state passed legislation permitting
foreigners to acquire and own property with the stipulation that all disputes involving property
would now be tried in Ottoman courts.66 In 1869, the Ottoman state passed a law creating the
institutions of citizenship, thus making it illegal for Ottoman citizens to seek the extraterritorial
status permitted under the capitulations.67 By the 1870s, the state had instituted Europeanstyle
commercial courts in the major centers of trade and commercial activity, including Izmir, Edirne,
Selanik, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo.68 In terms of legal rationalization and
centralization to meet the challenge of European powers, the process was generally successful in
erecting a legal framework that reasserted Ottoman sovereignty while accommodating growing
European economic interests, which could not be ignored.
While the Ottoman Empire had, at first, intended that European codes be limited to the
Nizamiye courts, Ottoman reformers and European elites began to desire and implement their
outright transplantation into its legal system.69 Reformers drew upon the 
Nizamiye model and
created new domestic courts that utilized European codes. French codes laid the basis for the
Ottoman Commercial Code (1850), the Ottoman Penal Code (1858), the Code of Commercial
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Procedure (1861), and the Code of Maritime Commerce (1863).70 The legal reformers preferred
the French codes because they were the most comprehensive and widelyused European codes
available at the time.71 Significantly, the Empire was the first muslimmajority state to
implement a European legal code of its own accord rather than being a colonial imposition.72
Similarly, Egypt, in imitation of the Ottoman center, instituted 
Nizamiye courts in 1875 and
domestic courts on the same model in 1883, both of which drew mostly upon European codes
and partly upon islamic jurisprudence.73 Through drawing upon Western legal traditions, the
reforms of the nineteenth century introduced openly secular legislation rather than the cloaked
secular legislation of the kanun
.74 However, as Chapter 1 and 2 illustrate, the change constituted
more of a transition in the relative influence and configuration of different legal traditions and
principles that were already present in the Empire rather than a true break with what had come
before. As an additional consequence, the introduction of more secular elements did not
necessarily mean the marginalization of those with a religious basis.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire continued to
Westernize its legal system. With the accession of sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876  1909), the
Empire’s discourse became much more visibly Islamic than it had been under the previous
Tanzimat elites. 
However, despite a changing discursive emphasis and increased religious
centralization, the Hamidian attitude toward legal reform was consistent from the prior period.
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Instead of integrating Islamic law into the European codes, during the reign of Abdulhamid II,
“much of the constructive work of the Tanzimat was continued and extended.”75 In a similar way
to Meiji Japan and other nonEuropean states undergoing Europeanstyle modernization,
Abdulhamid II attempted to retain an Ottoman, PanIslamic identity with Western institutions.76
The later Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (r. 1908  1918) continued the process of
modernization along European lines with a marginalization of Islamic law. In 1916, the state
transferred all 
sharia courts, which had been left to arbitrate matters of personal status and
family matters, from the 
seyhulislam to the direct administration of the Ministry of Justice and
the Islamic schools to the Ministry of Education.77 After World War I, Mustafa Kemal and his
followers seemingly brought the process of escalating Westernization and modernization to its
logical end by declaring Islamic law to be illegal and instituting another series of European codes
as the single constitutive element of the Turkish Republic’s legal system.
While the majority of the Ottoman Empire’s reformist elites were satisfied with the
marginalization of Islamic law from political life and the transplantation of European legal
codes, a minority wanted to pursue a more gradualist trajectory. The minority wanted to
reinvigorate the Empire’s legal framework and and fuse its Islamic heritage into the fabric of a
modern, centralized state. The leader of the minority group was the 
Tanzimat official Ahmed
Cevdet Pasha who, from 1869  1877, issued the first codification of Islamic law, the 
Mecelle
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(Law Collection). Cevdet’s life and actions outline the course of gradualist reform that could
have occurred in the Empire.
Ahmed Cevdet
Despite his importance to the Ottoman age of reform and later Islamic legal
developments, the life of Ahmet Cevdet life has garnered a lessdeveloped literature than most of
his contemporaries. In the words of one writer, Cevdet was truly “one of the most underrated
men of the 
Tanzimat period.”78 Cevdet was a unique figure in that he bridged the administrative
world of the Westernizing reformists with the academic world of the religious establishment, the
ulema
. Supplementing his Islamic educational base, Cevdet studied the legal traditions of
individual European countries, with a particular emphasis on that of France, and international
law.79 Through his experiences, Cevdet came to believe that the Empire had to modernize, but
also thought it was possible to achieve modernization through modifying and adapting the
indigenous legal system rather than the wholesale transplantation of European codes.80 When
Mustafa Resit, the architect of the 
Tanzimat
, wanted to find an expert in Islamic law who had the
flexibility to be able to accommodate his reformist agenda and diffuse opposition from the
embattled 
ulema
, Cevdet, with his extensive studies of both Islamic and Western law and
institutions, was the perfect candidate.81
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From 1858 onward, under the tutelage of Mustafa Resit, Cevdet gained administrative
experience to supplement his academic base. When he began his sixth term as grand vizier, Resit
made Cevdet a member of the Council of the 
Tanzimat
, the chief engine of reform in the Empire.
Cevdet utilized his legal education by creating and administering numerous institutions in a way
that combined the Ottoman Empire’s Islamic institutional and legal heritage with European
equivalents. Specifically, in regard to law, Cevdet created “regulations on land ownership and
cadastral surveys” and “was the principal author of the regulation that created the new Supreme
Council of Judicial Ordinances in place of the Council of the 
Tanzimat
” to which he would
accede as a member,82 along with serving in a series of administrative posts of increasing power
and prominence.
The Mecelle
In 1868, Ahmed Cevdet served as the chairman of the commission tasked with creating a
new Europeanstyle law code that incorporated Islamic legal principles for the Ottoman Empire.
Prior to the convening of the commission, Cevdet played a significant role in convincing the
sultan that “the new civil law code should be based on principles derived from Islamic law,
modernized to meet current realities.”83 Cevdet and his colleagues’ administrative and academic
experience allowed them to forge a powerful fusion of Islamic and Western law in the tradition
of the earlier, prereform juridical continuum that had existed in the Empire, but also marked a
unique development in the history of Islamic law. From 1869 to 1876, the state enacted the
product of Cevdet’s Law Commision, the 
Mecelle (Law Collection), the first Europeanstyle
legal codification of 
fiqh
.
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The composition and release of the 
Mecelle marked a new era in the history of Islamic
law. Previously, Islamic law had not operated as a statutory law in the sense of setting precedent
and establishing legislation, was not codified along European structural lines, and did not operate
off the increasingly positivistic, in contrast to naturalistic, foundation that European legal
systems were expressing. Instead, 
fiqh was the attempt to interpret and organize the 
sharia
according to specific interpretative principles that the 
madhhabs established and, in certain cases,
modify those principles to meet changing realities. In the traditional framework, when a 
qadi
issues a 
fatwa
, the 
fatwa is not binding for all cases of a similar nature in the future; rather, it
only serves as a judgement in the individual instance and relies for all its power upon the 
qadi
’s
“personal religious authority.”84 In this regard, the Islamic juristic tradition stands in contrast to
the European traditions of Common Law and Civil Law. When a Common Law judge delivers a
ruling, he or she sets a precedent that other judges utilize and when a Civil Law judge delivers a
ruling, he or she does so according to a set of established statutes that contain a fairly limited
field of possible interpretation. Civil Law, which structured the transplanted French codes, is
“grounded in rationality and it is objectively enforced by the rational judgements of competent
tribunals” with judges as “executors of this law [who] have themselves no claim to represent the
charismatic authority of powerful individuals.”85 In this way, the 
Mecelle combined Islamic legal
principles with the structure of European Civil Law, generating a new transformation in the
history of Islamic law. However, while the 
Mecelle undoubtedly signalled a shift in Islamic law
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to “European models of the state and administration of justice,”86 it is important to recognize that
the Islamic juristic legal tradition had coexisted and coevolved with statutory traditions since the
establishment of the first 
madhhabs
.87 For example, the Ottoman 
kanun was a type of statutory
law that had existed alongside the juristic law of the Ottoman Sunni Hanafi 
madhhab and others
for centuries.88 Thus, the main way that the nineteenthcentury European legal traditions differed
from those that had already been present in the Empire were their positivistic orientation.
However, the extent to which previous statutory laws like the 
kanun expressed and were truly
conceived under the principles of natural law rather than those of legal positivism is still unclear.
Cevdet and his colleagues were the first in the history to take Islamic legal principles, as
established by individual 
madhhabs
, and establish them as a type of statutory law. Cevdet and
his colleagues drew upon the Civil Law tradition of Europe, as expressed through various French
codes, as their statutory context. In this way, the 
Mecelle was an attempt “to codify the rules of
contract and tort according to the Hanafi school, combining European form with Shari’a
content.”89 The new type of Islamic law would differ from the juristic process of 
fiqh because it
would now rely for its authority on the extent to which the 
qadi enforced established legislation
rather than almost purely upon his expertise and education. The process of codification was also
significant in its own right. The 
Mecelle included “sixteen books addressing the issues of sales,
debts, ownership, lawsuits, evidence, and judicial procedure.”90 In the process, the 
Mecelle
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“simplified a huge part of the relevant principles and made them more accessible to litigants and
jurists.”91 Excepting family law, which the 
Mecelle left to the domain of the traditional 
sharia
courts, the 
Mecelle
constituted a comprehensive civil code.92
The 
Mecelle
also innovated in its application of existing Islamic legal principles.
Within Islamic law, 
tahhayyur is the practice of incorporating rulings and principles from
different 
madhhabs according to what the jurist determines to be relevant and correct.93 Before
the 
Mecelle
, the application of 
tahhayyur had been fairly common within the 
madhhabs
themselves, but the composition of the 
Mecelle marked the first time that the jurists had used the
practice to matters of Islamic law relating to state policy.94 In the context of the 
Mecelle
, the use
of 
tahhayyur became associated with selecting the Islamic legal principles of that “seemed most
suitable to the prevailing conditions of society.”95 The revised definition allowed Islamic legal
scholars to select the rulings and principles that would facilitate accommodation between
Western political and economic institutions while retaining Islamic influence. More broadly, the
methodology of the 
Mecelle would fuel a larger trend toward eclecticism within Islamic law and
jurisprudence, leading to comparatively greater amounts of legal innovation.96 The principles of
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tahayyur
, codification, and the recasting of Islamic law as a statutory tradition would heavily
influence subsequent attempts to reform Islamic law during the process of modernization.
During the remaining history of the Ottoman Empire, there were some other important
legal developments in Islamic law, the most prominent of which was the Ottoman Family Law of
1917. Following the model of the 
Mecelle
, the authors of the Family Law used the principle of
tahayyur to select individual rulings from different 
madhhabs
. However, whereas the 
Mecelle
had drawn upon those of the established 
madhhabs such as Hanafi, Shafi, and Maliki, the authors
of the Family Law expanded 
tahayyur to include individual jurists that operated outside of the
dominant 
madhhabs
.97 Specifically, the Family Law drew upon the rulings of Mu’tazli scholars
on the issue of guardianship in marriage.98
Despite the 
Mecelle
’s comprehensiveness, vitality, and level of compliance that it was
able to inspire, Ahmed Cevdet and his colleagues failed to stem the rising tide of Westernization.
In the wake of the 
Mecelle
’s promulgation, Cevdet found himself profoundly disenchanted with
the inability of the 
Tanzimat to stem the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and its
domination by European economic and political interests.99 European states in particular
continued either to flout the Ottoman codes or force the state to assume a more aggressively
European orientation. As the century wore on, it seemed to many domestic elites and foreign
observers that, despite Cevdet’s significant innovation, Islamic law was in an inevitable,
irreversible decline.
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Implementation of Islamic Legal Reform
While the process of recentralizing its authority may have constrained its ability to
institute Islamic legal reforms, the Ottoman Empire was able to inspire substantial compliance in
both its central and outlying provinces. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century,
local elites had carved out their own semiautonomous states that sought to implement reform on
their own terms. While the center, theoretically and legally, had authority over provincial
governments, it often did not possess the power necessary to enforce its policies, especially in
the more peripheral provinces of North Africa and the Levant.100 Therefore, the extent and
character of Islamic legal and institutional reforms in a given area depended upon the existing
relationship with the Ottoman center and local conditions. For example, in response to the
Tanzimat Decree of 1839, Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Ottoman Egypt, agreed to grant his
subjects the civil rights that the 
Tanzimat Decree instituted, but reserved the right to interpret the
Decree in terms of its applicability to cases and codification into law.101 In 1841, desiring more
vigorous compliance with its reforms, the Ottoman center capitulated and issued a specific
decree allowing Ali to modify his reform process “in accordance with the requirements of the
locality and the principles of justice.”102 In other cases, provincial developments in Islamic law
prefigured those at the center such as the abolition of slavery in Tunisia in 1846 prior to its
abolition by the Ottoman center in 1857.103
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However, while provincial elites had more authority the further from the Ottoman
Empire’s center they were, there appears to be a rough uniformity in the process of
nineteenthcentury legal reform and acceptance of reforms from the center. For example, while
Muhammad Ali and his descendants had the power to institute legal reforms as they pleased,
Egyptian reforms proceeded along almost the same lines as those in the Ottoman center.104
Moreover, the 
Mecelle
, the Ottoman civil code that Ahmed Cevdet composed remained active in
the Empire’ former Arab domains for the next sixty years, with Israel being the last to abolish it
in 1984.105 Even if the Empire may not have been able to enforce its legal reforms through an
operative system of law, it was able to erect a normative system that motivated its outlying
subjects to adopt them and may have influenced the behavior of neighboring or constituent states
like Ottoman Egypt. As a corollary that is relevant to discussion about the possibility of Islamic
legal reform during this period, it does not appear to be the case that limitations of authority
would have prevented the Empire from applying Cevdet’s approach to the rest of its law codes.
Conclusions
The rise of Europe presented new challenges to the Ottoman Empire and significant,
sweeping transformations in its legal system. In particular, the increasing economic and political
power of European states caused the gradual erosion of Ottoman sovereignty. In response, the
Empire attempted to strike a middle way of reform between appeasing European interests and
retaining its Islamic identity through through reforming its legal system. While Ottoman
reformers initially implemented European legal codes on a limited basis, mostly in cases
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involving foreign nationals, the process soon intensified with the outright transplantation of
European codes into the Ottoman legal system, resulting in a strengthening of the statutory
tradition of law whose lineage lay in the 
kanun
. Simultaneously, a minority of legal reformers,
such as Ahmed Cevdet, aspired to preserve the parity between Islamic and nonIslamic legal
principles that had historically existed in the Empire. However, ultimately, the promulgation of
the 
Mecelle was an intellectual and institutional anomaly within the larger movement toward the
Westernization of the Empire’s legal system. The question of why the 
Mecelle failed to set the
precedent for further reform within the Empire is the primary concern of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4: OBSTACLES TO ISLAMIC LEGAL REFORM
Why Marginalize Islamic Law?
As the preceding section demonstrates, Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire continued to
be dynamic, situated, and interactive with evolving conditions during the period of nineteenth
century reform. In spite of the power and attraction of European codes, there was still a dedicated
group of reformers like Ahmed Cevdet who capitalized upon the Empire’s syncretic legal
history, the reception of foreign novelties, and reinterpretations of existing principles to recast
the Ottoman Islamic legal tradition, and Islamic law more generally, into a new form. The
process of transformation yielded the Empire’s civil code, the 
Mecelle
.
Given that the 
Mecelle existed, the question emerges as to why the Ottoman Empire did
not implement its intellectual and methodological model more widely and why, instead, the state
slowly proceeded down the path of rising Westernization. The answer lies in the proximity of
European states and their rising power within the worldsystem along with numerous obstacles
that generated instability in the Ottoman state, which invited further intervention and seemed to
confirm the supremacy of the West, its institutions, and its laws. Whereas the prior chapter
demonstrated the impact that European proximity to the Empire had upon the impetus for legal
reform, this chapter examines the role that it played in limiting the potential for reforms similar
to Ahmed Cevdet’s model from taking hold.
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The Rise of Europe
The major challenge that confronted the Ottoman Empire’s attempts at creating a fusion
of Islamic and Western law was the rise of Europe. As their control over Islamic societies
increased, European states used the opportunity to implant their legal and administrative systems
because doing so supported their material and ideological objectives.
As Chapter 1 explained, two of the key elements of the Orientalist paradigm are that all
Islamic societies are essentially the same and that they cannot substantially change. Within the
minds of Europeans who were either intentionally or unintentionally ignorant of the Empire’s
syncretic legal history, the Orientalist paradigm necessarily precluded the possibility of Islamic
legal reform. More broadly, the Orientalist paradigm that European states assumed toward
Islamic societies was part of a larger pattern, stretching back to the colonization of the Americas,
in which they denigrated and rendered invisible the legal systems of nonEuropean societies.106
Insofar as nonEuropean societies and states did not possess systems that reflected European
traditions of statehood, sovereignty, and law, European states did not recognize them as
constituting true systems; rather they considered indigenous systems as adhoc, inefficient, and
unenlightened confluences of customary practice or as nonexistent.107 In the few cases that the
Europeans did recognize indigenous legal traditions as constituting systems, as they did in the
case of their interactions with Islamic societies, they asserted that they were inherently incapable
of reform or coexistence with European systems.108 European states utilized the rationale of the
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superiority of their systems and the inferiority and irregularity of the indigenous systems to
justify legal transplantation.
Expressing the Orientalist paradigm, European colonial officials within the Ottoman
Empire believed that, despite the work of those such as Ahmed Cevdet, efforts to reform Islamic
law were in vain because it could not be reformed.109 For example, British consular reports
charged the Ottoman state with being unable to implement Westernizing reforms, let alone
construct an effective fusion of Islamic and Western law. In 1880, one British consular official
charged, “The populations in Anatolia are not in a sufficiently advanced state of intellectual
development to understand the beneficial purpose of laws framed in a more liberal spirit that the
existing ones.”110 Reports such as these are important because they not only express the
Orientalist paradigm that colonial officials possessed toward the Ottoman Empire’s legal system,
but also demonstrate their profound lack of knowledge of it with frequent mistakes and
mischaracterizations about the most fundamental of details.111 Thus, it is possible that the basic
assumptions of the Orientalist paradigm created expectations with the minds of the colonial
officials despite the absence of evidence to confirm them. As European colonial elites precluded
the possibility of reform, some also firmly believed that it was their mission to bring modernity
to nonEuropean societies through reforming the legal apparatus of nonEuropean societies.112
Moreover, European states also utilized the Orientalist paradigm to justify their occupation and
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remaking of Islamic societies, which benefited the growth of their political and economic
power.113 Further integration between the European center and the periphery meant that
European states would become even more powerful and dominant.114 Therefore, the Orientalist
paradigm supplied the ideological base for legal transplantation, and material and humanitarian
impulses would supply the impetus.
Of course, it is also important to recognize that the ability of European states to act upon
these aims rested upon the comparative power of their institutions and material resources in
relation to nonEuropean societies. During the period of colonialism, if a nonEuropean state
could take advantage of technological and intellectual innovations from the West, as was the
case in Meiji Japan, it was more likely to be able to retain its sovereignty and aspects of its
indigenous identity than states who were not able to do so as effectively, as was the case with
neighboring Qing China. Consequently, it is important to examine the Ottoman Empire’s
reaction to the rise of Europe, which would affect its ability and desire to retain Islamic law.
Ottoman Elite Attitudes
One of the major difficulties confronting Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire during the
nineteenth century was that its elites were very receptive to the Orientalist paradigm from
Europe, which encouraged the marginalization and abolition of Islamic law. Historically, the
elites of the Empire had played a decisive role in establishing and maintaining its legal apparatus.
Moreover, other than being the historically powerful force at the top of the state apparatus,
during the nineteenth century, Ottoman elites were all the more dedicated to their purpose of

113

114

Abdullahi Ahmed AnNacim, "The Compatibility Dialectic," 11.

John R. Schmidhauser, “Legal Imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and PostColonial Judicial
Systems,” 
International Political Science Review
13 (3) (1992): 331.

43
reform because they “perceived [themselves] as the only source for the revival of the Ottoman
state and the idea it represented.”115 Whereas the Ottoman public was not necessarily in favor of
the legal reforms that elites undertook, the elites were, because of their power in society, able to
act upon their beliefs and desires to move into the direction of reform that they desired.116 Given
the cursory historical and intellectual survey at the beginning of this analysis, it would seem
obvious that the Ottoman elites did not believe that Islamic law was monolithic and unchanging.
However, in the late Empire, most Ottoman reformers drew upon the the Orientalist paradigm
from Europe, which would influence the types of reforms that they would propose and initiate.
The majority of the Ottoman Empire’s elite reformers came out of the bureau of
translation and correspondence with European states, in which they imbibed Western ideas about
nonWestern societies like Orientalism.117 Thus, the elites believed that the only way to be
reform was to integrate the Empire into European networks and that the only way to do so was
by adopting European economic, political, and social models.118 In doing so, the Empire would
become a power equal to the European states.119 As a necessary corollary, most of the elites came
to believe that Islamic law was backward and could not meet the emerging needs of a modern
state, especially as it engaged with the institutional networks that the Europeans had erected.120
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Specifically, in line with the Orientalist idea about the decline of 
ijtihad
, Ottoman elites believed
that Islamic law could not adapt to meet the needs of European economic institutions and
practices.121 Accordingly, even though, intellectually and empirically it was questionable
whether there was a necessary link between modernity and the marginalization of Islamic law,
the elites sought to reform upon European lines. 
Another major internal obstacle to the Empire’s
attempts to reform its legal institutions and to do so on the basis of a fusion of Islamic and
Western law was the institutional barrier between the Westernoriented elites and the 
ulema
.
Institutional Barriers Between Ottoman Reformers and the Ulema
When the 
Tanzimat commenced, the Ottoman Empire’s religious offices did not
experience the same level of the development and empowerment that other Ottoman ministerial
departments underwent. Even before the alienation of the 
ulema during the nineteenth century,
there were significant institutional divisions between the religious and administrative
establishment of the empire, especially in regard to top positions. For example, during the entire
history of the Empire, Ahmed Cevdet was the only person to transition to the rank of 
vezir
, an
administrative office, from the rank of 
kazasker
, a religious office.122 Rather than strengthening
existing religious institutions or leaving them alone, the state actually undermined, weakened,
and marginalized them. In 1839, the state established the Council of State, in part, in order to
weaken the Office of the Seyhulislam and the 
ulema
’s relative standing within the Ottoman
government. Since the Office of Seyhulislam was the arbiter of Islamic law in the Empire, its
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decline led to the decline of Islamic law as well.123 In the legal sphere, the Westernizing reforms
widened the existing gap between statutory law, which traced its institutional lineage to the
earlier 
kanun
, and Islamic law.124 The judicial reforms also tended to reduce the judicial power of
the 
qadis and 
muftis
, especially in view of the administrative and judicial power they had
possessed during the preceding seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.125 In 1870, the state
founded the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice, depriving the 
ulema of much of
their administrative role.126 More generally, the state tended to coopt the members of the 
ulema
who possessed the greatest early promise, encouraging a general decline in the vibrancy of
religious institutions.127 Accordingly, while the highranking ulema initially supported the reform
attempts of Selim III (r. 1789  1807) and Mahmud II (r. 1808  1839), they began to feel
alienated by the speed of modernization, especially with the extent to which reformers were
importing European principles, traditions, and institutions into the Empire.128 Consequently, the
ulema became more intellectually conservative and hostile toward any type of reform, even an
approach that would imbue the Europeanstyle institutions with some semblance of Islamic base.
Ahmed Cevdet’s involvement in the administration of the Ottoman Empire also met with
considerable hostility from the ulema itself. Because of its marginalization under the
nineteenthcentury reforms, most of the 
ulema resented anyone who it felt was part of the state
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bureaucracy and, thus, was betraying the interests of the institution as a whole. Consequently,
Cevdet faced significant opposition, envy, and hostility to his involvement in spheres of conduct
such as military and administration, which went beyond the traditional spheres of the 
ulema
,
such as education, scholarship, and juridical study.129 It had been rumored that Cevdet, because
of his prominence in the religious establishment, was in line to assume the leadership of the
ulema by becoming the 
seyhulislam
, chief 
mufti of the Empire, but the conservative leadership
prevented his proposed appointment because he possessed a more liberal orientation.130 Given
the alienation of the 
ulema from the state apparatus, Cevdet was remarkably unique in that he
was one of the few Ottoman reformers who received religious training in the 
ulema and still
possessed the reformist spirit of many in the state apparatus.131 Thus, the hostility that developed
between the 
ulema and the state, and the cooption of the best minds into the state apparatus,
generally prevented other figures like Cevdet from arising who might have sought to incorporate
Islamic law into the Empire’s other legal codes.
Economic Weakness and Fragility
Another key aspect of Europe’s challenge to Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire was
economic. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state attempted to correct what it
perceived to be the “misrule and inefficiency of provincial administration” that had developed
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly the devolution of power and fiscal
apparatus to provincial centers rather than Istanbul.132 For example, the state encountered
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significant challenges in modernizing and centralizing its fiscal structure through the abolition of
taxfarming. On February 7, 1840, the state reorganized the old tax system so that, whereas it had
previously based taxes on a mix of Islamic, statutory, and sultanic law, it now based them on a
fixed ratio according to taxpayer's income and capacity to pay.133 However, the new system
faltered because the taxfarmers saw little incentive to transfer their existing knowledge and
relationships within rural districts to their successors from Istanbul.134 The difficulty to
reorganize the fiscal structure early on was particularly problematic as the Empire found itself
engaged in multiple wars on its European frontier. If the Empire had possessed a more
centralized, efficient fiscal base at the beginning of the century, it would not have been forced to
borrow as heavily as it did from European creditors.
The strength of European economies combined with comparative Ottoman fiscal
weakness yielded a potent combination for increased Western legal influence in the Ottoman
Empire. In the face of an increasingly poor economic position, Ottoman reformers believed that
reforming the Empire’s legal system along European lines would allow indigenous industry to
compete more effectively by easing access to foreign markets.135 However, “legal reform made it
easier for European merchants to do business locally” and “deepened the marginal economic
position of the Ottomans in the emergent global economy.”136 Beginning with an 1838 freetrade
agreement, the developed markets of Europe deluged the Empire with cheap, manufactured
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goods, displacing indigenous industry with a superior economy of scale and more sophisticated,
powerful modes of production.137 In response to the increasing relative value of resources to
European markets, Ottoman markets increasingly consolidated around the exportation of raw
materials, drawing away capital from the already beleaguered industrial sector.138 However, as
the process continued, the terms of trade worsened with the Ottoman markets receiving
manufactured goods that were less valuable than the raw materials that they were exporting.
Moreover, the foreign direct investment that the Empire received was intended almost
exclusively to meet the demands of European investors who were focused upon
resourceexportation and manufactureimportation, and the infrastructure necessary to expand
and deepen the system.139 In order to secure the investment, the Ottoman state also had to pay
disproportionately high interest rates of interests on its loans and commit itself to a
disproportionately high number of contractual guarantees to European creditors.140 In short, legal
reforms intended to assert Ottoman sovereignty and independence from the imposition of foreign
control, although conceptually sound and thorough, lacked the capacity to meet the creeping
power of European states.141
One prominent example of these trends was the downfall of the Mehmet Ali regime and
the British occupation of Egypt. Seeking to strengthen his domain against European invasion, Ali
reorganized the Egyptian state apparatus along European lines. Ali focused the Egyptian

137

V. Necla Geyikdagi, 160.

138

Enid Hill, “Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern Law,” 299.

139

V. Necla Geyikdagi, 165.

140

Ibid.

141

Feroz Ahmad, 6.


49
economy upon the production of cashcrops such as cotton, which the state could export to
European consumers; he did so with the hope that there would be sufficient capital accumulation
to fund eventual domestic industrial production.142 As in the Ottoman Center, Egyptian elites
established a European legal apparatus in order to settle disputes between European merchants
and Egyptians, facilitating increased trade and investor confidence.143 While Egypt’s economic
growth greatly increased, its lack of economic diversity and highly unequal contractual
agreements with European creditors meant that even a small economic disruption could drag the
whole state into default.144 Eventually, continued economic reversals led to European creditors
taking over management of the economy, which inspired a fierce backlash among the Egyptian
people who eventually toppled Ali’s regime.145 In 1882, the breakdown in order led to British
occupation and cession. Once the British took control of Egypt, they reformed its legal system to
integrate it further into their empire. Whereas, before the British takeover, the Egyptian state had
limited Western legal principles and institutions to the the 
Nizamiye courts, in 1883, only one
year after they took control, the colonial government instituted native courts along European
lines, relegating Islamic law to 
sharia
courts that only arbitrated matters of personal status.146
The Ottoman center suffered from a similarly poor economic position and, thus, while
not undergoing a European takeover, experienced a similar pattern of events, which lead to
increasing legal transplantation. Beginning with the Crimean War, the Empire endured almost
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fifty years of constant conflict with European states and nationalities who sought to partition it,
gradually weakening the state’s institutions and ability to resist foreign domination.147 The
almost constant state of conflict forced the Empire to issue large amounts of debt to remain
solvent, in addition to the debts it had already incurred to fund its economic modernization
projects.148 By the 1870s, the Ottoman state was spending 60% of its annual tax revenues just to
pay down the everincreasing burden.149 In an echo of the Egyptian case, the Empire’s combined
debts became so excessive that, in 1881, European powers forced the state to establish the
Ottoman Debt Commission whose members represented the interests of foreign bondholders.
The Commission possessed “extraordinary power to use tax payments to reimburse foreign
investors” and with its establishment, “the Ottoman Empire essentially ceded control of its
finances to Western Europeans.”150 Throughout this period, the extent of legal transplantation
generally increased and it does not appear to be coincidental that the extent of legal
transplantation and, hence, the extent of Islamic law, in many different Islamic societies, such as
the Ottoman Empire, corresponded to the Europeans’ material objectives rather than Islamic
law’s incompatibility with that of the West.
Reforming its legal system along European lines, although optically necessary to
accumulate the capital necessary to compete with European manufacturers, actually facilitated
further European control over and peripheralization of the Empire. As more time passed, the
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Empire had less capacity to institute Islamic legal reform and codification, which both European
and Ottoman elites believed would undermine their interests.
Conclusions
During the nineteenth century, European states expanded their influence in the Ottoman
Empire to support their material and ideological objectives. In this process, legal transplantation
served a vital role because it facilitated the growth of European economic and political influence.
European states supported legal transplantation by arguing that the legal systems of
nonEuropean societies were either nonexistent or could not be reformed. Among the many
Islamic societies that European states attempted to influence and control, the Ottoman Empire
was unique in its ability to ability to remain comparatively sovereign until its dissolution after
World War I. As a result, the Empire, unlike other Islamic societies of the period, was able to
undergo a limited process of Islamic legal reform. Although its scope was limited, the 
Mecelle
demonstrated the conceptual and institutional viability of Islamic legal reform despite the
objections of Ottoman reformers and European elites.
However, as the century progressed, Ottoman reformers became more convinced of the
superiority of Western law, the institutional barriers between the 
ulema and the elites became
more ossified, and the Empire fell deeper under the influence of European creditors and
governments, all of which contributed to the move toward legal transplantation. As a result,
specific conditions that were largely unrelated to Islamic law’s intellectual viability or ability to
coexist with other traditions of law led to its marginalization. At the very least, local conditions
existing during the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Empire were important in shaping the expression
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and character of Islamic law and were likely more determinative than the characteristics that
constitute Islamic law as an ideal type.

CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMATIONS IN ISLAMIC LAW AFTER WORLD WAR I
Islamic Law in the Turkish Republic After World War I
After World War I, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters wrested control of Anatolia away
from other competing factions and sought to continue the Westernizing trajectory of their
Ottoman reformist predecessors. In their attitude toward Islamic law, the Kemalists shared “the
drive toward centralization, regularization, and monopolization, which were pursued by the late
Ottoman and early republican governments.”151 However, the Kemalists differed principally
from their bureaucratic and intellectual predecessors in their comparatively higher level of
hostility and paranoia they expressed toward religious institutions. One reason for the Kemalists’
attitude was ideological. In creating a Turkish nationalist identity, the Kemalists wanted to
distance themselves from the Ottoman Empire, particularly in regard to the primacy of religion
in shaping the state’s discursive identity and institutions.152
The other major reason for the Kemalists’ more thoroughgoing secular attitude was
pragmatic. In the wake of World War I, with the near partition of the Anatolian core of the
Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Allied powers, the Kemalists were especially attentive to
possible threats that could challenge the stability of the state, and invite further foreign
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intervention and partition. In part, the Kemalists pursued a more vigorous Westernizing program
than their predecessors because opponents of their regime often appealed to a traditional Islamic
identity as the basis of their authority and sought to coopt Ottoman religious institutions for
leverage.153 Importantly, as with the Westernizing trajectory of nineteenthcentury legal reform,
Kemalist secularism was a policy that emerged over time in response to changing conditions; in
this case, the policy originated from growing perceptive threats from Islamic institutions rather
than a necessary movement toward secular, modernity. The fact that the Kemalists expressed
PanIslamist attitudes during the initial founding of the Turkish Republic until their opponents
began to used Islamic institutions to challenge them tends to support the abolition of Islamic law
as a contingent phenomenon.
On April 23, 1919, a Grand National Assembly convened in Ankara and elected Mustafa
Kemal as president. During this initial stage, the nationalists professed their loyalty to the Sultan
and the Caliph. In accordance with Ottoman rituals, the Assembly sacrificed sheep, held a public
recitation of the Qur’an, and displayed relics of the prophet in a processional march. However, in
response to the declaration of a republic, the 
seyhulislam in Istanbul issued a 
fatwa decrying the
nationalists and urging true believers to destroy them; on May 1, the Istanbul government
similarly condemned Kemal and his supporters to death. However, support for the Ankara
government increased in the wake of the Greek advance into Anatolia, which greatly undermined
the legitimacy of the Istanbul government. On July 2, further coopting the religious legitimacy
of the Istanbul government, Kemal called upon Turkish citizens to rise in holy war against the
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foreigners and expel them from the country.154 Later, in December 1919, Mustafa Kemal made a
speech in which he appealed to the remaining populations of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim
Kurds and Turks, to band together in panIslamic unity.155
However, during a cabinet meeting on October 31, 1922, Kemal announced that the only
way forward for the Turkish nation would be to abolish the sultanate, neutralizing the power that
the Istanbul regime possessed. The next day, November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly
separated the office of the sultanate from the office of the caliphate. In doing so, Kemal wanted
to deprive the Istanbul faction of any leverage that it possessed in determining the future of the
country by undermining its legitimacy, but wanted to proceed carefully in order to not alienate
cultural conservatives. Having lost one institution with which they could oppose the regime,
Kemal’s detractors circled around the caliphate as an alternative mechanism to gain power.
These opponents encouraged the caliph to petition Mustafa Kemal for expanded powers and a
defined role within the new Turkish state. Realizing that his opponents would now use the
caliphate, rather than the sultanate, to oppose him and the Turkish Republic, Kemal responded
sharply and decisively. When the caliph petitioned Mustafa Kemal, he issued a public
proclamation stating, “Let the caliph and the whole world know that the caliph and the caliphate
which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence … The position of
Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a historical memory.”156 On March 3,
1924, the Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate outright. Kemal was willing to allow
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the Caliphate to exist as an office and institution only if it did not challenge his nationalistic,
Westernizing program. When the caliph and his supporters appeared to pose a threat to the
stability of the nascent republic, Kemal’s secularizing attitude heightened considerably.157 As
time passed, Kemal prohibited political parties who challenged his program158 and made
advocating for reincorporation of the 
sharia into the legal system a criminal offense.159 The
Penal Code of 1926 set out specific penalties for those who “by misuse of religion, religious
sentiments, or things that are religious considered as holy, in any way to incite the people to
action prejudicial to the security of the state, or form associations for this purpose.”160
Attempting to secure their authority and undermine their political opponents, the
Kemalists energized the process of legal transplantation that had begun during the nineteenth
century. Early in the history of the republic, the Kemalists had attempted to create a new Turkish
legal code, but the Ministry of Justice submitted a draft that expressed substantial influence from
Islamic legal principles, similar to Ahmed Cevdet’s 
Mecelle
.161 Rather than drawing exclusively
upon the French codes, as the Empire had done with its legal transplantation, the Turkish
Republic drew upon many different European legal codes, finding the ones would best reflect the
unique position of the Turkish people.162 On October 4, 1926, the state instituted a new civil
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code, based on the Swiss civil code; on July 1, 1926, the state instituted a new criminal code,
based on the Italian criminal code; and instituted a commercial code based on the German
commercial code.163 Finally, whereas the original 1924 Turkish Constitution identified Islam as
the state religion and declared the National Assembly’s obligation to enforce Islamic law, in
1928, the state declared the separation of 
din wa dawla
, “religion and state,” and proscribed the
legal quality of religions within the state.164 The state retained 
waqfs or religious foundations, but
now assumed the majority of their revenues and later abolished them in the mid 1930s.
The Kemalists also eliminated the religious offices that oversaw the arbitration of islamic
law. On March 3, 1924, the state eliminated the statefunded 
ulema by vacating their remaining
contracts and pensioning them off. On April 8, 1924, a National Law Court Organization
Regulation (
Mahkeme Teskilati Kanunu
), abolished the 
sharia courts, vacated the judges’
contracts, and transferred their jurisdiction to the the secular court system. During the same year,
the state also abolished the office and position of 
seyhulislam and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
and Religious Foundations, replacing it with the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The state
mandated that the Presidency of Religious Affairs would be under the direct control of the prime
minister and that its role and functions would sharply curtailed.
Despite the marked changes to Islamic law that it implemented, the Kemalist regime still
exhibited its continuity with the Ottoman experience. In addition to the ideological and
pragmatic impetus for reform, the Kemalists expressed the Ottoman heritage of substantial
control over Islamic law’s development and the institutions that oversaw it. Kemal and his
supporters, similar to the way that Ottoman governments had approached religion, used the
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organs of state and the media to create a Turkish nationality with which the people could
identity.165 The Kemalists used Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to propagate a version of
“enlightened islam,” which would provide a moral code for society, but not invade that
nationalist, secular public sphere.166 After the establishment of the DRA, the state sought to
reduce further the heterodox communities and practices such as the Sufis.167 Rather than
supporting an alternate form of solidarity, Islam would constitute part of secular solidarity.168 In
the

publicsphere,

the

explicitly

nationalist

discourse

dominated

while

the

progressivelyoriented, Sunni Hanafi discourse fused itself into the private lives of citizens.169 As
a result, the relative ease with which the Kemalists were able to eliminate Islamic law depended
substantially upon the specific context of Islamic law in the Ottoman legal system.170
While the secular program of the Kemalists conceived of the traditional relationship
between religion and state in a new way, it maintained an ideological and genealogical
consistency with what had come before. Kemalism represented a gradual evolution in the
ideology of reform from one that attempted to marginalize Islamic law through a largely
gradualist, traditionalist paradigm to one that abolished Islamic law and replaced it with almost
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entirely new foundations.171 However, the desire to establish ideological and institutional
authority, and not material or intellectual necessity, catalyzed the move to abolish Islamic law.
Islamic Law in Arab States After World War I
After World War I, differences in local conditions gave rise to divergent developments in
Islamic law among the domains of the former Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, the Kemalists sought
to identify national identity with a preIslamic, Aryan past and prevent political opponents from
using Islamic law to mobilize against them. As a result, the Kemalists recast religion as
belonging purely to the private sphere rather than being an integral part of national life, as it had
been in the Empire. According to the Kemalists, since religion was to be a part of the private
sphere, the laws of the new republic were to have no basis in Islamic law.172 Conversely, in the
Empire’s former Arabmajority domains, nationbuilding entailed identification with a glorified
past in which the prophet Muhammad, as the father of the Arab people, and his accomplishments
were integral.173 Therefore, the Arab nationalists, in contrast to the Turkish nationalists, tended to
support reconciling Islamic and Western traditions of law in a discursive and institutional
capacity.
In constituting new legal codes, the Arab reformers drew upon the models that Ahmed
Cevdet and other Ottoman reformers had created with the completion of the 
Mecelle
. The most
prominent of these Arab reformers was the Egyptian jurist ‘Abd alRazzaq alSanhuri. Using an
approach that was highly influenced by Cevdet’s framework, Sanhuri drafted the Egyptian Civil
Code of 1948, the Iraqi Code of 1951, the Libyan Code of 1953, and the Kuwaiti Commercial

171

Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 375.

172

M. Hakan Yavuz, 160.

173

Richard A. Debs, 143.

60
Law of 1960/1.174 In Egypt, whereas the civil code instituted during the nineteenth century had
been “the superimposition of a Western Civil Code on traditional Islamic institutions,” the legal
code of the midtwentieth century “was a closer integration of the foreign and traditional
elements in that system … designed to serve the needs of a modern, developing nation.”175
Importantly, Sanhuri justified his approach of Islamic legal modernization by arguing that
Islamic law was one of the great systems of law, equal in stature to the Civil and Common law
traditions of Europe.176
Ahmed Cevdet’s influence on Sanhuri and the Arab reformers is undeniable. Sanhuri
created legal codes that framed Islamic legal principles within a European apparatus instead of
the juristic model that had predominated before Cevdet.177 Sanhuri also drew upon Cevdet’s use
of 
tahayyur to apply the Islamic principles that were most in line with conditions present in
contemporary society, especially within the postcolonial context and among distinct states with
varying conditions.178 The principle of 
tahayyur 
would also prove immensely influential among
twentiethcentury Arab jurists.179 Arab jurists used 
tahayyur to compose many national family
laws, whereby Hanafidominant states drew upon both Maliki and Hanafi rulings on divorce and
marriage contracts, usually selecting the tradition that afforded Muslims the most flexibility and
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autonomy.180 The 
Mecelle itself would also serve as one of the principal sources for various
MiddleEastern civil codes such as the Iraqi Civil Code.181 In the Francophone Islamic world,
jurists like Marcel Morand drew upon the 
Mecelle to construct their own compilations of Islamic
law.182 Other jurists in Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) drew upon
Sanhuri’s revision of Cevdet’s model in their own revisions and codifications of islamic law.183
The Legacy of the 
Mecelle
in Contemporary Debates on Islamic Law
Since the composition and institution of the 
Mecelle
, scholars of Islamic law have
differed as to the way forward. Some advocate for the establishment of pre
Mecelle juridical
independence whereby individual 
qadis can issues 
fatwas according to their legal expertise and
muftis issue judgements in regard to novel or unclear issues. This oppositional line of thought
traces its origin, in part, to the original reaction against codification in the late nineteenth
century; the most vigorous expression of intellectual revolt against Ahmed Cevdet’s reforms
occurred in Yemen where Zaidi imams cited its promulgation as justification for revolts in 1891
and 1904.184 Others advocate for the institution of Islamic law along the lines that the 
Mecelle
established whereby legislators compile Islamic legal principles from individual 
madhhabs and
establish them as statutory law. Still others lament the tendency toward what they consider to
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excessive eclecticism in Islamic law postCevdet.185 Moreover, scholars debate whether the
transformation of Islamic law into a statutory tradition demonstrates the vitality and adaptability
of Islamic juridical principles or represents a contamination by alien traditions and cooption by
outside actors.186 In many states, these differing conceptions have come into conflict. One
prominent instance of this tension occurred when the King Ibn Saud attempted to establish the
interpretations of several Hanbali jurists as statutory law for all other 
qadis
to follow.187
Conclusions
After World War I, evolving conditions within the nascent Turkish Republic lead to
Islamic law’s further marginalization and eventual abolition. In contrast, differing conditions in
the Ottoman Empire’s former Arab regions lead to alternate developments. Arab legal reformers
sought to continue the project of Ahmed Cevdet by combining Islamic legal principles with a
European statutory form. Significantly, the fact that these Arab reformers were able to seize upon
Cevdet’s model and states instituted codes based on it tends to undermine the view that Islamic
law does not and cannot coexist with other legal traditions. The difference in outcomes also
further demonstrates the tremendous impact that local conditions have upon the expression and
character of Islamic law.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
As this historical survey demonstrates, Islamic law derives much of its character from
local political, economic, social, and environmental conditions. Within the Ottoman experience,
Islamic law was situated within a Sunni Hanafi tradition that interacted dynamically with
CentralAsian, Iranian, and other nonIslamic traditions. During the nineteenth century, multiple
legal traditions continued to operate within the Ottoman Empire with a more vigorous European
influence than before. However, the European tradition did not establish itself as the dominant,
and eventually sole, basis for legislation as part of a necessary move toward modernity as
Orientalism and the Clash Thesis would suggest. Instead, growing instability within the Empire
and the efforts of proWestern Ottoman elites increased the European hold over the state,
gradually leading to legal transplantation. Nonetheless, Ahmed Cevdet and a small group of
reformers drew upon the rich intellectual history of Islamic law, particularly the experience of
Ottoman Islamic law, to create a new synthesis of Islamic legal principles and Western
structures. Although the conditions within the late Ottoman Empire precluded the restoration of
Islamic law, different conditions led to Cevdet’s framework to be integral in the attempts of Arab
legal reformers to incorporate their Islamic heritage into the fabric of Western modernity.
Insofar as, throughout its existence, Islamic law has shaped and been shaped by
surrounding conditions, the divisions between different civilizations that Orientalism and the
Clash Thesis maintain appear amorphous and dynamic rather than stark and unchanging. The
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fact that Islamic law depends so thoroughly upon local conditions makes it difficult to determine
the degree to which the legal systems of various states draw upon it. In most states that currently
employ or draw upon Islamic law, the division between European, Islamic statutory law, and
Islamic juristic law is often unclear and amorphous. The constitution may declare that the 
sharia
is the fundamental basis of all legislation and, in the absence of prescribed statutes, all judges
should defer to its principles. However, the actual effect and character of the Islamic elements
within the legal code are not readily evident until one has conducted an exhaustive survey of the
individual system. Even with multiple assessments by top legal scholars, it has been difficult to
establish an academic consensus. At the very least, this study undermines the value of
considering Islamic law as an ideal type in academic and policy analysis, which composes a vital
part of Orientalism and a constituent part of the Clash Thesis.
Looking forward, this relatively cursory study into the development and character of
Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire will help to challenge the Orientalist and culturalist
assumptions that have constrained MiddleEastern and Islamic studies, and spark more accurate
and fruitful scholarship.
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